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Abstract
In this article we examine the effects of third degree price discrimina-
tion in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price
is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We find that the
asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for
the lowest-valuation consumers and firms produce equal quantities to the
other consumer groups.
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1 Introduction
There is an emerging literature dealing with non-linear pricing in oligopolies.1
Hazledine (2006) examines third degree price discrimination in a symmetric
Cournot model, where firms are able to segment their consumers by ranges of
reservation price. Consumer with reservation price between ri−1 and ri pay one
price, those between ri and ri+1 pay another, and so on. In this framework, he
∗The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Corvinus University of Bu-
dapest through the Talentum Program and the TAMOP-4.2.2/B- 10/1-2010-0023 fellowship.
1For a general overview of the literature on price discrimination, see Stole (2007)
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shows that the output sold at a particular price is a multiple n of the output
sold at the next lowest price, where n is the number of firms in the market.
Furthermore, he finds that the average price charged does not depend on the
number of different prices offered. Kutlu (2009) analyzes the effect of second
degree price discrimination in the Stackelberg competition model, and shows
that the follower firm does all price discrimination, while the leader firm has an
incentive not to price discriminate at all. However, this result is not robust if
the marginal cost of the leader is lower than that of the follower. Arijit (2010)
shows that in this case both firms practice price discrimination.
In this paper we examine second degree price discrimination as modeled by
Hazledine (2006) but instead of using a symmetric setup we introduce asym-
metric firms. Our main finding is that in any asymmetric Cournot oligopoly the
output-weighted average price is not dependent on the extent of price discrimi-
nation, hence the standard single-price Cournot model does not mislead in this
respect.
2 The model and the results
Consider an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Firms produce homogenous product
with constant marginal costs. There are two types of firm (1 and 2) which differ
in their marginal costs. The marginal costs of type j (j = 1, 2) is cj , with
c2 > c1 ≥ 0. Thus, type 1 is more cost effective than type 2. For the sake
of tractability we define c ≡ c2 − c1. Consumers differ in their valuation and
each one buys at most one unit of the good. Firms know the valuation of the
consumers and can prevent resale of the good.
We assume that firms divide the consumers into different groups (K) accord-
ing to their valuation. The price of the good for the group kth(≤ K) is given
by
pk = a−Qk (1)
where Qk ≡∑ki=1(∑ls=1 qi1s +∑mr=1 qi2r) is the total quantity sold to all groups
from 1 to k, and l denotes the number of the firms of type 1 and m the number
of type 2, respectively. We simplify our model by assuming that l = m = 1,
though it is possible to show that our results hold in the general case as well.
To motivate such a setting consider an airline industry, where the tickets are
purchased in unit quantity and it is a standard practice to price discriminate.
Consumers usually come to the market at different times and their valuations is
negatively correlated with the length of time between purchase and the actual
flight (see Gale (1993)).
Given the demand and cost functions, firm j’s decision problem consist of
offering quantity menu (q1j , q
2
j , . . . q
K
j ) that maximizes its profit, given the other
firm’s quantities. Formally, this can be written as:
max
q1j ,q
2
j ,...,q
K
J
pij =
K∑
k=1
(pk − cj)qkj
2
= (a− q1j − q1−j − cj)q1j
+(a− q1j − q1−j − q2j − q2−j − cj)q2j
...
+(a− q1j − q1−j − q2j − q2−j − . . .− qKj − qK−j − cj)qKj (2)
where qk−j stands for the quantity offered by the other firm to the consumer
group k and j 6= −j.
Deriving (2) with respect to the decision variables qkj we get the first order
condition for the profit maximization. The first order conditions can be written
as follows:
∂pij
∂qkj
= a− cj −
K∑
i=1
qij − qkj −
k∑
i=1
qi−j = 0 (3)
for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K and j = 1, 2. Then, subtracting the k + 1th from kth
equation we have:
qk+1j − qkj + qk+1−j = 0 (4)
for j = 1, 2. Summing these expressions over j yields:
qkj + q
k
−j = 2(q
k+1
j + q
k+1
−j ) (5)
or
qkj + q
k
−j = 2
K−k(qKj + q
K
−j) (6)
The following result is immediate from the above discussion.
Proposition 1 Price discrimination in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly re-
sults in an output sold to the consumer group k being multiple of the output sold
to the consumer group k + 1.
The reason for this behavior is that firms incentives to offer a higher quantity
is increasing in prices.
Furthermore, for k = 1 equation (3) simplifies to
a− cj −
K∑
i=1
qij − q1j − q1−j = 0 (7)
for j = 1, 2 and j 6= −j. Subtracting these equations from each other over j
yields
K∑
i=1
qij =
K∑
i=1
qi−j + c (8)
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Plugging this into the kth first order conditions we can write:
qkj +
k∑
i=1
qi−j = q
k
−j +
k∑
i=1
qij (9)
or
k−1∑
i=1
qij =
k−1∑
i=1
qi−j (10)
This implies that
qkj = q
k
−j for every k = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 1.
qKj = q
K
−j + c. (11)
Both firms produce the same output for each consumer group with a relatively
high valuation and the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output
offered for the lowest valuation consumers.
Proposition 2 In an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly each firm produce equal
quantity in every segment except the lowest valuation sub-market for which the
cost effective firms offer a quantity bigger with c than the high cost firms.
To calculate the equilibrium quantities consider the followings. Proposi-
tion (2) and equation (6) implies that qkj = 2
K−k−1(2qK2 + c) for every k =
1, 2, . . . ,K − 1 and j = 1, 2. Then
K−1∑
i=1
qkj =
K−1∑
i=1
2K−k−1(2qK2 + c)
= (2K−1 − 1)(2qK2 + c) (12)
Now, plugging this into the (3) when k = K yields:
0 = a− cj −
K∑
i=1
qij − qKj −
K∑
i=1
qi−j
= a− cj − (
K−1∑
i=1
qij + q
K
j )− qKj − (
K−1∑
i=1
qi−j + q
K
−j)
= a− 2
K−1∑
i=1
qij − 3qK2 − 2c (13)
Substituting (12) into (13) implies
Proposition 3 In an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly price discrimination re-
sults in the following equilibrium quantities (k = 1, . . . ,K − 1 and j = 1, 2):
qkj =
(2K−k−1)(2a− c)
2K+1 − 1 , q
K
1 =
a+ (2K − 1)c
2K+1 − 1 q
K
2 =
a− 2Kc
2K+1 − 1 (14)
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To examine the implication of price discrimination for the average price
charged in the market we define the output-weighted average price as follows:
pKav ≡
K∑
k=1
pi(qij + q
i
−j)
QK
(15)
Theorem 1 In an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly the output-weighted average
price does not depend on the extent of price discrimination. That is, for any K
and c
pKav = p
K+1
av
Proof. Substituting (12) into QK = 2
∑K−1
i=1 q
i
j + q
K
1 + q
K
2 we have that:
QK = (2K − 1)(2qK2 + c) (16)
Then, Proposition (3) yields:
qkj + q
k
−j = (2
K−k)(2qK2 + c) (17)
Using (1), the prices charged in the segment k can be written as:
pk = a−
k∑
i=1
(qij + q
i
−j) = a− (2qK2 + c)(2K − 2K−k) (18)
Hence, the output-weighted average price charged simplifies to:
pKav =
K∑
i=1
((
2K−i
2K − 1
)
(a− (2qK2 + c)(2K − 2K−i))
)
(19)
Substituting into this the equilibrium value given by Proposition (3) for qK2 ,
straightforward calculation yields:
pKav =
1
(2K − 1)(2K+1 − 1)
K∑
i=1
(2K−i(2K−i+1 − 1)a+ 2K−i(2K − 2K−i)c) (20)
for any K and c. Thus, the output-weighted average price for K + 1 can be
written as:
pK+1av =
1
(2K+1 − 1)(2K+2 − 1)
∑K+1
i=1 (2
K−i+1(2K−i+2 − 1)a+ 2K−i+1(2K+1
−2K−i+1)c) (21)
This leaves us to show that:
(i) (2K+2−1)∑Ki=1(2K−i(2K−i+1−1)) = (2K−1)∑K+1i=1 (2K−i+1(2K−i+2−1))
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(ii) (2K+2 − 1)∑Ki=1(2K−i(2K − 2K−i)) = (2K − 1)∑K+1i=1 (2K−i+1(2K+1 −
2K−i+1))
First consider (i). The sum at the LHS can be written as:
K∑
i=1
(2K−i(2K−i+1 − 1)) =
K∑
I=1
22K−2i+1 −
K∑
I=1
2K−i
=
K∑
i=1
2(4K−i)−
K∑
i=1
2K−i
= 2
(
4K − 1
3
)
− (2K − 1) (22)
Thus, the LHS simplifies to:
(2K+2 − 1)
(
2
3
(4K − 1)− (2K − 1)
)
=
2
3
2K+24K +
1
3
2K+2 − 22K+2 − 2
3
4K
+2K
=
8(8K)− 14(4K) + 7(2K)
3
(23)
In the same way we can prove that the RHS can be written as
(2K − 1)
K+!∑
i=1
(2K−i+1(2K−i+2 − 1)) = (2K − 1)(2
3
(4K+1 − 1)− (2K+1 − 1))
=
2
3
2K4K+1 +
1
3
2K − 22K+1 − 2
3
4K+1
+2K+1
=
8(8K)− 14(4K) + 7(2K)
3
(24)
which proves that (i) is true for any K and c.
Using the same technique it is easy to show that condition (ii) always holds
for any K and c.
3 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the output-weighted average price charged in
an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly model does not depend on the extent of price
discrimination. Under cost asymmetry firms produce equal outputs for the most
of consumer groups and only the lowest valuation group is being offered with a
higher quantity by the cost effective firm. We show that in every segment the
output sold at a particular price is a multiple of the output sold at the next
lowest price.
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